• Jeff Ely

A Cake-Cutting Solution to Gerrymandering

Updated: Apr 18, 2019

I propose a mechanism for redistricting inspired by cake-cutting mechanisms for fair division. The majority party proposes a partition of a state into districts. The minority party can accept it or undo any partisan disadvantage caused by irregular boundaries. Thus without imposing any requirement of regularity, the mechanism ensures that to the extent that irregular districts result from the process, the minority is never harmed by them.


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Jeffrey Ely

Department of Economics

Northwestern University

2211 Campus Dr Evanston, IL 60208

Curriculum Vitae

©2019 by Jeffrey Ely.