• Jeff Ely

Optimal Feedback in Contests

Joint with George Georgiads, Sina Khorasani and Luis Rayo We derive optimal contests for environments where output takes the form of breakthroughs and the principal has an informational advantage over the contestants. Whether or not the principal is able to provide real-time feedback to contestants, the optimal prize allocation is egalitarian: all agents who have succeeded in a pre-specified time interval share the prize equally. When providing feedback is feasible, the optimal contest takes a stark cyclical form: contestants are fully apprised of their own success, and at the end of each fixed-length cycle, they are informed about peer success as well.

Read it here.

Recent Posts

See All

Joint with Andrea Galeotti and Jakub Steiner We study rotation schemes that govern individuals’ activities within an organization during an epidemic. We optimize the frequency of rotation and degree o

Joint with Jakub Steiner and Andrea Galeotti A health authority chooses a binary action for each of several individuals that differ in their pre-test probabilities of being infected and in the additiv

Joint with Laura Doval We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive-form vary. An analyst may know the payoff-relevant data but not the players' private