• Jeff Ely

Sequential Information Design

Updated: May 26, 2020


Joint with Laura Doval


We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive-form vary. An analyst may know the payoff-relevant data but not the players' private information, nor the extensive-form that governs their play. Alternatively, a designer may be able to build a mechanism from these ingredients. We characterize all outcomes that can arise in an equilibrium of some extensive-form with some information structure. We do this for a range of extensive-form solution concepts.


Read here.


Supplemental Material


A Note on Bayes' Rule Where Possible


Watch my presentation of the paper here

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Jeffrey Ely

Department of Economics

Northwestern University

2211 Campus Dr Evanston, IL 60208

Curriculum Vitae

©2019 by Jeffrey Ely.