Optimal Feedback in Contests Joint with George Georgiads, Sina Khorasani and Luis Rayo We derive optimal contests for environments where output takes the form of bre...
Rotation as Contagion Mitigation Joint with Andrea Galeotti and Jakub Steiner We study rotation schemes that govern individuals’ activities within an organization during ...
Optimal Test Allocation Joint with Jakub Steiner and Andrea Galeotti A health authority chooses a binary action for each of several individuals that differ in th...
Sequential Information Design Joint with Laura Doval We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive-form vary. An analyst...
A Cake-Cutting Solution to Gerrymandering I propose a mechanism for redistricting inspired by cake-cutting mechanisms for fair division. The majority party proposes a partition of...
Moving the Goalposts Joint with Martin Szydlowski We study information as an incentive device in a dynamic moral hazard frame- work. An agent works on a task ...
Suspense and Surprise Joint with Alex Frankel and Emir Kamenica We model demand for non-instrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entert...
Beeps I introduce and study dynamic persuasion mechanisms. A principal privately observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends messa...
Torture Joint with Sandeep Baliga We study torture as a mechanism for extracting information from a suspect who may or may not be informed. We sh...
Critical Types Joint with Marcin Peski How can we know in advance whether simplifying assumptions about beliefs will make a difference in the conclusion...
